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Abstract
This research argues that variations in the interplay between cultural assimilation and cul-
tural diﬀusion have played a signiﬁcant role in giving rise to diﬀerential patterns of economic
development across the globe. Societies that were geographically less vulnerable to cultural
diﬀusion, beneﬁted from enhanced assimilation, lower cultural diversity and, thus, more intense
accumulation of society-speciﬁc human capital, enabling them to ﬂourish in the technological
paradigm that characterized the agricultural stage of development. The lack of cultural diﬀusion
and its manifestation in cultural rigidity, however, diminished the ability of these societies to
adapt to a new technological paradigm, which delayed their industrialization and, thereby, their
take-oﬀ to a state of sustained economic growth. The theory contributes to the understanding
of the advent of divergence and overtaking in the process of long-run development, attributing
the dominance of some societies within a given technological regime to a superior operation of
cultural assimilation, while the success of others in the switch between technological regimes to
a higher frequency of cultural diﬀusion and the beneﬁcial eﬀect of diversity on the adaptability
of society to a changing technological environment. Thus, in contrast to the cultural and insti-
tutional hypotheses, which posit a hierarchy of cultural and institutional attributes in terms of
their conduciveness to innovation and their ability in fostering industrialization, the proposed
theory suggests that the desirable degree of the relative prevalence of cultural assimilation versus
cultural diﬀusion varies according to the stage of development. Enhanced cultural assimilation
is optimal within a given stage of development, but is detrimental for the transition between
technological regimes. Therefore, while cultural traits themselves do not necessarily have a dif-
ferential eﬀect on the process of development, it is the variation in the relative strengths of the
forces of cultural assimilation and cultural diﬀusion, which together determine the heterogeneity
of these traits, that is instrumental for comparative economic development.
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The contemporary distribution of income per capita across countries attests to a Great Divergence in
their developmental paths since the Industrial Revolution, bearing witness to reversals in economic
performance for some of the technological leaders in the pre-industrial era. The gap in per capita
GDP between the richest regions of the world and the poorest increased from a modest 3 to 1 ratio
in 1820 to an astounding 18 to 1 ratio in 2000 (Maddison, 2001). Moreover, historical evidence
indicates that, as late as the end of the 1st millennium CE, the civilizations of Asia were well ahead
of Europe in both wealth and knowledge.1 Nonetheless, by the time of the Industrial Revolution
in the 18th century, Europe had already overtaken these societies (Landes, 1998).
This research argues that variations in the interplay between the forces of cultural assimi-
lation and cultural diﬀu s i o nh a v ep l a y e das i g n i ﬁcant role in giving rise to diﬀerential patterns of
economic development across the globe, contributing to the Great Divergence and to reversals in
economic performance. In particular, societies that were geographically less vulnerable to cultural
diﬀusion beneﬁted from enhanced assimilation, lower cultural diversity and, thus, greater accumu-
lation of society-speciﬁc human capital, ﬂourishing in the technological paradigm that characterized
the agricultural stage of development. The lack of cultural diﬀusion and its manifestation in greater
cultural rigidity, however, diminished the ability of these societies to adapt to a new technological
paradigm, delaying the onset of their industrialization and, thereby, their take-oﬀ t oas t a t eo f
sustained economic growth.
The fundamental hypothesis of this research stems from the recognition that the evolution
of the wealth of nations has been governed, in part, by the conﬂicting eﬀects of cultural assimilation
and cultural diﬀu s i o ni nd i ﬀerent stages of development. The universal force of cultural assimila-
tion (i.e., the homogenization of cultural traits within a society), contributed to the accumulation
of society-speciﬁc human capital and, hence, to society’s ability to eﬃciently exploit the exist-
ing technological frontier. However, vulnerability to cultural diﬀusion (i.e., the spread of cultural
traits from one society to another) disrupted the force of assimilation in society, hampering the
accumulation of society-speciﬁc human capital, while augmenting cultural diversity and, thus, the
latent adaptability of society towards a looming technological regime. Societies that were histor-
ically characterized by geographical conditions conducive to cultural diﬀusion, therefore, incurred
the costs associated with ineﬃciencies in socioeconomic organization within a given technological
paradigm, operating ineﬃciently with respect to their technological frontier during the agricultural
stage of development. Nonetheless, the more frequent disruption of the assimilation process in these
societies conferred the long-run beneﬁts of greater cultural ﬂuidity and ﬂexibility, stimulating their
1It has been argued by historians that Chinese technology long anticipated advancements during the Industrial
Revolution in Europe. For example, in textiles, China had been employing water-driven machinery in the 12th
century, ﬁve hundred years prior to the appearance of similar technologies in Europe, while the early use of coal and
coke for iron smelting in China resulted in iron production amounts in the 11th century that were only matched in
Europe seven hundred years later. Detailed historical accounts on the early dominance of Asian societies and the
European overtaking have been given by Abu-Lughod (1989), Chaudhuri (1990), Goody (1996), Wong (1997), Frank
(1998), Pomeranz (2000) and Hobson (2004).
1accumulation of universal human capital and fostering their ability to implement a paradigmatic
shift of the technology frontier towards industry.
The proposed theory contributes to the understanding of the advent of divergence and
overtaking in the process of long-run development, attributing the dominance of some societies
within a given technological regime to a superior operation of cultural assimilation, while the
success of others in the switch between technological regimes to a higher frequency of cultural
diﬀusion and the beneﬁcial eﬀect of cultural diversity on the degree of adaptability of society to a
changing technological environment.
The theory is based on three fundamental elements. The interaction between these elements
generates a dynamic pattern that is consistent with the observed asymmetrical evolution of societies
from an epoch of Malthusian stagnation to a regime of sustained economic growth, characterized
by a Great Divergence in cross-country income per capita as well as reversals in the economic
performance of some societies.
The ﬁrst element pertains to the role of cultural assimilation in enhancing the intergen-
erational transmission, and, thus, the accumulation, of society-speciﬁc human capital.2 Cultural
assimilation reduces diversity by standardizing sociocultural traits (e.g., norms, beliefs, ethics and
codes of conduct) in society. It improves the eﬃciency with which society-speciﬁc human capital is
transmitted across generations, thereby, augmenting total factor productivity with respect to the
available production technologies. This observation is consistent with empirical evidence on the
development-promoting eﬀects of greater social cohesion or social capital.3
The second element embodies the notion that cultural diﬀusion, as reﬂected by the frequency
of emergence of alternative modes of behavior in society, generates greater ﬂuidity and ﬂexibility
that enhances the accumulation of knowledge, and, thus, more widely-applicable general human
capital, expanding the economy’s production possibility frontier and complementing its ability to
advance and adapt to a new technological paradigm. This view is broadly consistent with theoretical
and empirical evidence on the creativity-promoting eﬀects of diversity in the workforce.4 Cultural
2This implicitly invokes an evolutionary theory, pioneered by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd and
Richerson (1985), where the intergenerational transmission of cultural traits occurs both vertically (i.e. from parents
to children) and horizontally (i.e. from role models in society to the younger generation). In the context of the
proposed theory, a higher prevalence of conformism in the adult generation would imply smaller discrepancies between
parental traits and those in society at large and, thereby, a more consistent transmission of conformist attitudes to
the succeeding generation. For explicit applications of this evolutionary framework in the economics literature, see
Bowles (1998), Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001) and Spolaore and Wacziarg (2006).
3See, Knack and Keefer (1997), Temple and Johnson (1998), Zak and Knack (2001) and Gradstein and Justman
(2002). The reader is also referred to Fukuyama (1995) for general arguments based on a historical perspective. In
addition, Spolaore and Wacziarg’s (2006) ﬁnding that the developmental gap between societies is negatively associated
with the degree of their cultural or genetic similarity, arguably due to lower barriers to technology adoption, is related
to the concept that cultural homogeneity within societies confers beneﬁcial eﬀects on their economic development in
the proposed theory.
4Hong and Page (2001) provide a theoretical formalization of this idea, proving that a group of “cognitively
diverse” problem solvers can ﬁnd optimal solutions to diﬃcult problems, and that a more diverse group of people
with limited abilities can outperform a homogeneous group of high ability problem solvers. Moreover, Berliant and
Fujita (2006) develop a microeconomic model of knowledge creation through cooperative interactions between people
and demonstrate that heterogeneity is essential for successful cooperation in the joint creation of ideas. In the context
2diﬀusion, therefore, has an ambiguous eﬀect on total factor productivity. Productivity is fostered on
one hand by the accumulation of general human capital, and diminished on the other by ineﬃciencies
in the intergenerational transmission of society-speciﬁc human capital.
The third element is designed to capture the importance of general human capital in pro-
moting socioeconomic transitions to a new technological regime that is potentially more advanced
in terms of per capita income. Consistent with historical evidence on the transition from agriculture
to industry, the economy is characterized by a greater complementarity between the advancement
of the knowledge frontier and technological inventions that are applicable to industrial production
as opposed to agricultural production.5
Cultural traits (i.e., conformist and nonconformist attitudes towards the prevailing culture)
are transmitted intergenerationally. In the absence of forces operating on these traits, individuals
possess their parental cultural dispositions and the proportion of nonconformists in a society’s
working population thus remains constant over time. Individuals, however, are subjected to two
cultural forces that generate opposing eﬀects on the evolution of a society’s cultural composition
with respect to the prevalence of nonconformism: cultural assimilation and cultural diﬀusion. The
former represents forces, internal to society, that lower the prevalence of nonconformism, via the
homogenization of cultural traits. The latter, in contrast, represents geographically determined
forces, external to society (e.g., the inﬂuence of a nearby foreign culture), that raise the prevalence
of nonconformism, via the periodic introduction of heterogeneity in cultural traits.
In particular, the economy’s population, being composed of both conformist and noncon-
formist individuals, is subject to the inherent gravitational inertia of cultural assimilation, which
functions to homogenize the discordant attitudes in society and, thereby, reduce the degree of
cultural heterogeneity in the population over time. The process of assimilation, however, is op-
p o s e db yt h eg e o g r a p h i c a l l yg o v e r n e df o r c e so fc u l t u r a ld i ﬀusion, whereby the periodic emergence
of new behavioral attitudes and ideas in society, via cross-cultural contact, functions to increase
the nonconformist fraction of the population over time.
In early stages of development, the economy is in a Malthusian regime where output is
generated exclusively by an agricultural sector that is subject to decreasing returns to labor. Tech-
nological progress is rather gradual, occurring via relatively small increments to the economy’s
stock of knowledge, which is positively aﬀected by the size of the population and the degree of
its cultural heterogeneity. Resources generated by technological progress are channeled primarily
towards an increase in population size, and the economy evolves along a dynamic path, character-
of team theory, Prat (2002) has established that heterogeneity raises team productivity when jobs within teams are
complementary to one another. Similarly, Lazear (1999a, 1999b) has also discussed how diversity in a productive unit
can raise overall productivity once the costs associated with language barriers are taken into account. The beneﬁts
of heterogeneity are further highlighted by Ottaviano and Peri (2005, 2006) who have empirically demonstrated the
productivity enhancing eﬀects of ethnic and cultural diversity in American cities.
5See, for example, Mokyr (2002) for a detailed historical account on the role of knowledge in bringing about
and sustaining the Industrial Revolution. The broad deﬁnition of knowledge provided therein is consistent with the
concept of general human capital in the current theory. The importance of general human capital in the adoption of
modern modes of production is also stressed in the recent model of Lester (2006).
3ized by growing population and total factor productivity, towards a Malthusian equilibrium where
income per capita remains stagnant.
The transition from agriculture to industry in the process of development is brought about
by sustained growth in the latent productivity of manufacturing labor. The larger degree of com-
plementarity between the expansion of the knowledge frontier and technological advancements
applicable to industrial production sustains the endogenous growth of latent manufacturing pro-
ductivity, which ultimately leads to the adoption of industry in later stages of development, paving
the way for a take-oﬀ from the Malthusian epoch. Upon the adoption of industry, the economy
emerges into a Post-Malthusian regime of development where output is generated using both the
agricultural and a manufacturing production technology. The endogenous growth of total factor
productivity in manufacturing, coupled with intersectoral labor mobility, sustains a dynamic path
characterized by endogenously growing population and income per capita.6
The interaction between culture and the process of development is examined based on the
signiﬁcance of their coevolution for Malthusian equilibrium outcomes in the agricultural stage of
development, and on the timing of the take-oﬀ from agriculture to industry. In the agricultural
stage, an economy characterized by a relatively higher proportion of cultural nonconformists in its
working population is also associated with a relatively inferior Malthusian steady-state, at least in
terms of the level of productivity per worker and the size of its working population. This inferiority
stems from the fact that the adverse eﬀect of nonconformism on the transmission of society-speciﬁc
human capital outweighs its beneﬁcial role in the moderate advancement of rural productivity, via
its contribution to cultural heterogeneity in the expansion of the knowledge frontier. The long-
run level of income per capita in this stage of development, however, is unaﬀected by the higher
prevalence of cultural nonconformism since the resulting lower level of productivity per worker is
counter-balanced by a smaller size of the working population.
The prevalence of cultural nonconformism, however, also has an eﬀect on the timing of
industrialization and, thus, on the take-oﬀ to a state of sustained economic growth. The earlier
take-oﬀ from the Malthusian steady-state by a society with a larger, but still moderate, proportion
of cultural nonconformists stems from the fact that the beneﬁcial eﬀect of nonconformism on the
advancement of knowledge, and, therefore, on the advancement of industrial productivity relative
to that in agriculture, outweighs its eroding eﬀect on the intergenerational transmission of society-
speciﬁc human capital. However, if the proportion of nonconformists is too large, an increase in
their prevalence raises the ﬂow of ideas while increasing the degree of anarchy in society, acutely
disrupting the transmission of society-speciﬁc human capital. The rate at which new ideas are
6Since the goal of the theoretical analysis is to unravel the eﬀects of the prevalence of nonconformism on the
properties of the Malthusian equilibri u ma sw e l la st h et i m i n go ft h et a k e - o ﬀ from the Malthusian epoch, the model
abstracts from the forces that ultimately lead to a demographic transition and the emergence of sustained economic
growth. Incorporating human capital and a quality-quantity trade-oﬀ in parental fertility choices would generate a
demographic transition, eventually leading to the emergence of a sustained growth regime, distinguished by rising
income per capita and zero (or, perhaps, even negative) growth in population. This modiﬁcation, however, would
signiﬁcantly complicate the analysis without altering the main insights.
4implemented and productivity is advanced in the economy is, therefore, diminished.
Variation in the moderate prevalence of nonconformism across societies is, thus, associated
with the phenomenon of overtaking in global economic development. A higher prevalence of non-
conformism generates an inferior outcome in the agricultural stage of development, but ultimately
stimulates an earlier industrialization and, thus, an earlier take-oﬀ to a state of sustained economic
growth. As such, the cultural composition of societies can have a profound eﬀect on their historical
experience with regard to the process of economic development.
The eﬀect of initial geographical conditions on the evolution of the cultural composition of
societies and, thus, on comparative development is examined based on their eﬀects on Malthusian
equilibrium outcomes in the agricultural stage of development, and on the timing of industrializa-
tion and the take-oﬀ to a state of sustained economic growth. An economy that is characterized
by greater geographical vulnerability to foreign cultural inﬂuences, and, hence, by more cultural
diﬀusion, is also associated with a relatively higher proportion of cultural nonconformists in its
population and, thereby, a relatively inferior Malthusian steady-state, in terms of the level of
productivity per worker and the size of its working population. This inferiority stems from the
fact that greater geographical vulnerability to cultural diﬀusion, leading to a higher prevalence of
nonconformism, has an adverse eﬀect on the transmission of society-speciﬁc human capital that out-
weighs its productive role in the moderate advancement of rural productivity, via its contribution
to cultural heterogeneity in the expansion of the knowledge frontier.
As long as the prevalence of nonconformism is not suﬃciently high so as to induce excessive
dissonance in the organization of society, however, an increase in cultural diﬀusion, due to more
vulnerable geographical conditions, expedites the onset of industrialization and, thus, the take-oﬀ
to a state of sustained economic growth. The earlier take-oﬀ from the Malthusian steady-state
by a society that possesses a higher, but still moderate, geographical vulnerability to cultural
diﬀusion, and, therefore, has a higher prevalence of moderated nonconformism, stems from the
fact that the beneﬁcial eﬀect of nonconformism on the advancement of knowledge, and, hence, on
the advancement of industrial productivity relative to that in agriculture, outweighs its eroding
eﬀect on the intergenerational transmission of society-speciﬁc human capital. In contrast, if the
degree of geographical vulnerability to cultural diﬀusion is too large, and, thus, the prevalence of
nonconformism too high, an increase in vulnerability raises the degree of anarchy in society, which
severely disrupts the transmission of society-speciﬁc human capital. Thus, while a higher degree of
vulnerability to cultural diﬀusion increases the ﬂow of new ideas, the rate at which these ideas are
implemented and productivity is advanced in the economy is diminished.
Variation across societies over a moderate range in the degree of geographical vulnerability
to cultural diﬀusion is, thus, associated with the phenomenon of overtaking in global economic de-
velopment. Speciﬁcally, a higher degree of geographical vulnerability generates an inferior economic
outcome in the agricultural stage of development, but ultimately stimulates an earlier industrial-
ization and, thus, an earlier take-oﬀ to a state of sustained economic growth. By inﬂuencing the
5cultural composition of societies throughout history, geography confers a profound eﬀect on their
experience with regard to the process of economic development.
2 Advances with Respect to the Related Literature
The origin of the Great Divergence has been a source of controversy. The relative inﬂuence of
geographical, cultural and institutional factors, human capital formation, ethnic, linguistic, and
religious fractionalization, colonialism and globalization has been at the center of the debate re-
garding the origins of the remarkable transformation of the world income distribution over the past
two centuries.
The signiﬁcance of sociocultural factors in giving rise to the diﬀerential development trajec-
tories of Europe and Asia has been the focus of an inﬂuential hypothesis raised originally by Max
Weber, in his works on the sociology of religion (1905, 1922), and promoted more recently by Hall
(1986), Lal (1998), Landes (1998, 2006) and others.7 The central premise of the cultural hypothe-
sis is implicitly that societal norms, customs and ethics can be ranked in terms of their ability to
nurture technological innovation and the “entrepreneurial spirit” of capitalist development. The
Weberian viewpoint, therefore, places the proclivity of European culture towards rationalism and
the objective “disenchantment of the world” at the forefront in explaining the rise of industry in
the Western world.8 Moreover, the emphasis placed by Oriental culture on rigid aesthetic values of
self-perfection and ﬁlial piety is held responsible for the delayed transition to a sustained growth
regime in the East.
The theory advanced in this study diﬀers signiﬁcantly from the existing sociocultural hy-
pothesis that underlines the existence of a hierarchy of cultural attributes according to their con-
duciveness to innovation and their applicability towards an industrial take-oﬀ. While society-speciﬁc
cultural traits (e.g., norms, beliefs and ethics) may well have some diﬀerential eﬀects on the process
of development, the proposed hypothesis suggests that it is the variation in the relative strengths of
the forces of cultural assimilation and diﬀusion, which operate over these traits, that is instrumental
for comparative economic development.9 The universal force of cultural assimilation, working to
7The term “culture” in this regard refers to the set of society’s norms, beliefs, customs, traditions, taboos, codes
of conduct, etc., and is, therefore, distinct from the notion of “institutions”, which has traditionally been regarded in
the literature as embodying the sociopolitical environment as determined by constitutions, rule of law and property
rights. North (1981, 1991), however, has advanced a broader notion of “institutions” in terms of a set of constraints
imposed to structure human socioeconomic interaction. These include both “informal constraints” such as customs
and traditions as well as “formal constraints” such as laws and property rights.
8Some economists have interpreted the emergence of the Weberian “capitalist spirit” in terms of the endogenous
evolution of preferences. Doepke and Zilibotti (2005a, 2005b), for example, stress the role of the subjective dis-
count factor in a theory of occupational choice and attribute the rise of capitalism to a complementarity between
human capital intensive occupations and “patience”. In addition, Galor and Michalopoulos (2006) have provided
an evolutionary growth theory emphasizing the evolution of risk aversion and it’s interaction with the process of
development.
9While not the focus of the current study, the endogenous emergence of social norms has been motivated from the
perspective of contract enforceability by Kandori (1992), Greif (1993, 1994) and others. Furthermore, in an approach
complementary to the proposed theory, Heiner (1983) and Harrington (1998, 1999) have argued that the emergence
6acculturate the divergent attitudes in society towards it’s customs and traditions, whatever these
may be, leads to greater cohesion and social order over time, which enables society to function closer
to the production possibility frontier of the existing technological paradigm. However, vulnerability
to cultural diﬀusion, which diminishes the standardization of society-speciﬁcc u l t u r a lt r a i t so v e r
time, simulates the adaptability of society to a new technological paradigm and, thereby, expedites
the onset of industrialization.
The role of favorable geographical conditions in fostering the earlier European take-oﬀ from
Malthusian stagnation has been given precedence by Jones (1981), Diamond (1997), Pomeranz
(2000) and others.10 They argue that the earlier rise of Europe could be attributed to its favorable
natural resource base, abundant rainfall, temperate climate, lower disease-burden, and its geo-
graphical proximity to the New World, which facilitated the escape from the Malthusian trap via
the alleviation of land constraints. The geographical hypothesis has also stressed an indirect role
of geography in promoting the earlier European take-oﬀ. It has been argued, particularly by Jones
(1981), that the natural barriers created by Europe’s mountain chains and rivers prevented a single
state from dominating the entire territory, and eventually led to sociopolitical fragmentation and
competition, encouraging innovative activities that contributed to an earlier take-oﬀ.
The element of geographical determinism in the proposed theory is distinct from that raised
i nt h el i t e r a t u r er e g a r d i n gt h ed i r e c te ﬀects of natural resource endowments (i.e. the inﬂuence of
climate, rainfall, disease burden, etc.). Speciﬁcally, the proposed theory attributes diﬀerences in
the frequency with which the force of cultural assimilation is hampered to variation in geographical
characteristics that determine the likelihood of emergence of new attitudes and ideas within societies
via cultural diﬀusion. Moreover, in contrast to the hypothesis of Jones (1981), where natural
barriers within Europe served to delineate societies that competed with each other in a process
that stimulated innovation and development for the region as a whole, the hypothesis in this
paper is that such internal barriers prevented the cultural homogenization of the entire European
continent and permitted a constant ﬂow of cultural diﬀusion within the region, thereby, expediting
the European transition to industry.11
The inﬂuence of institutions has been emphasized by North and Thomas (1973), North
(1981), Landes (1998), and Mokyr (1990, 2002), amongst others, who argue that institutional factors
that facilitated the protection of individual property rights and enhanced technological innovations
and the diﬀusion of knowledge were the prime forces behind the earlier European transition to
of rigidity versus ﬂexibility in social norms is governed by a social selection mechanism that rewards these attitudes
diﬀerentially depending upon the degree of uncertainty in the socioeconomic environment. It should also be noted
that norms themselves have been shown to aﬀect economic outcomes, as demonstrated empirically by Barro and
McCleary (2003), Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003, 2006) and Tabellini (2005).
10See, for example, Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999) and Olsson and Hibbs (2005).
11In addition, Simonton (2004) has convincingly argued for the diﬀerentiation of the interrelated but distinct
concepts of political fragmentation and cultural heterogeneity. For instance, as surveyed by the author, while some
empirical studies indicate a positive association between political fragmentation and innovation, others have found a
negative correlation between these variables. Indeed, these contradictory ﬁndings have led to a reformulation of the
Jones (1981) hypothesis in that “it is cultural heterogeneity that provides the crucial factor [for innovation], political
fragmentation only proving relevant insofar as it is associated with such heterogeneity” (Simonton, 2004, p. 50).
7sustained economic growth. Moreover, the endogenous nature of sociopolitical institutions, coupled
with the inherent exogeneity of geography, has recently prompted some researchers to propose
that initial geographical conditions gave rise to persistent diﬀerences in institutional quality across
regions.12 Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2000), for example, argue that societies initially characterized
by geographical factors conducive to income inequality also implemented oppressive institutions
designed to preserve the unequal distribution of wealth within their populations. Others, notably
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002), have argued that historical reversals in the economic
performance of societies have a colonial legacy that reﬂects the imposition of extractive institutions
by European colonizers in regions that were relatively aﬄuent in the pre-industrial era.13 The role
of colonialism in giving rise to the phenomenon of overtaking through institutional inversions is
clearly inapplicable, however, in explaining the delayed emergence of a sustained growth regime in
China, which, as economic historians have argued, represents one of the most signiﬁcant historical
reversals in global economic development.14
In contrast to the institutional viewpoint, where the quality of sociopolitical institutions
has an unequivocal eﬀect on economic growth, the eﬀect of the degree of cultural homogeneity
in the proposed theory is ambiguous, with greater homogeneity improving the eﬃciency of inter-
generational transmission of society-speciﬁc human capital on one hand, but also hampering the
accumulation of universal human capital on the other. The force of assimilation, therefore, permits
society’s advancement within a given technological regime through a well-deﬁned socioeconomic
structure, but also comes at the opportunity cost of hindering its progress towards a potentially
more advanced regime.15
The role of ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization in the emergence of divergence
through “growth tragedies” has been linked to their eﬀect on the quality of institutions. East-
erly and Levine (1997) and Alesina et al. (2003) have demonstrated that geopolitical factors that
12Recent empirical investigations by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002), Easterly and Levine (2003)
and Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004), appear to support the hypothesis that the geographical determinism
of contemporary economic development operates primarily through the eﬀects of initial geographical conditions on
institutional quality.
13Additional aspects of the long-run eﬀects of European colonialism on comparative economic development are
examined at a within-country level for India by Banerjee and Iyer (2005) and at a cross-country level for Africa by
Bertocchi and Canova (2002). In general, the ﬁndings in these studies are broadly consistent with the notion of a
deleterious institutional legacy of European colonialism in the colonized regions.
14An alternative hypothesis explaining how favorable geographical conditions could have given rise to historical
reversals in economic performance has been advanced by Galor, Moav, and Vollrath (2006) who emphasize the
negative impact of inequality in the distribution of land ownership on the emergence of human capital promoting
policies such as public schooling and child labor regulations.
15The institutional viewpoint typically underscores more politically-governed aspects of social structure such as
property rights, laws and constitutions, while this paper emphasizes the role of social cohesion that emerges naturally
from the homogenization of cultural dispositions in society with respect to it’s customs, traditions and codes of
conduct. Using the terminology adopted in North’s (1981) deﬁnition of institutions, the distinction here is that
between society’s formal and informal constraints. In particular, the proposed theory stresses the implementation
of informal constraints in society, as governed by the extent to which the force of assimilation can operate without
any external impediments. As such, the inertia of assimilation can also be interpreted as a “meta-constraint” where
its quality captures society’s ability to successfully indoctrinate subsequent generations to abide and follow the well-
established societal norms, beliefs and ethics.
8brought about a high degree of fractionalization in some regions of the world, led to the imple-
mentation of institutions detrimental for economic growth and, consequently, to a divergence in
developmental paths across societies.16 In contrast, one could view the current analysis as sug-
gesting that heterogeneity in cultural dispositions (i.e., conformist and nonconformist attitudes)
within a given ethnic group is conducive for industrialization, although the similar beneﬁts from
heterogeneity that is generated by the presence multiple ethnic groups is outweighed by the costs
associated with interethnic conﬂicts.
Finally, the role of human capital formation and the onset of the demographic transition
in giving rise to and sustaining the Great Divergence is stressed in the uniﬁed growth theories of
Galor and Weil (2000), Fernández-Villaverde (2001), Galor and Moav (2002), Lucas (2002), Lagerlöf
(2003, 2006), Doepke (2004), Galor and Mountford (2004, 2006), Galor (2005), Voigtländer and
Voth (2006) as well as in recent work by Galor, Moav, and Vollrath (2006), and is demonstrated
empirically by Glaeser et al. (2004). While tangential to the current analysis, these studies establish
theoretically and quantitatively that the rise in the technologically driven demand for human capital
in the second phase of industrialization, and its eﬀect on human capital formation and on the onset
of the demographic transition, were the central forces in the transition from stagnation to sustained
economic growth and in the emergence of the associated phenomenon of the Great Divergence. In
particular, they suggest that once the technologically driven demand for human capital emerged
in the second phase of industrialization, the prevalence of human capital promoting institutions
determined the extensiveness of human capital formation and, hence, the rapidity of technological
progress, the timing of the demographic transition, the pace of the transition from stagnation to
growth, and, thus, the contemporary distribution of income in the world economy.
3 Historical Evidence
Historical evidence suggests that, consistent with the proposed theory, the geographically governed
intensities of cultural assimilation and diﬀusion were indeed a signiﬁcant determinant of compara-
tive economic performance during the Malthusian epoch and in the transition from agriculture to
industry. Section 3.1, in particular, presents evidence that geographical isolation enhanced cultural
homogeneity and stability, which permitted a relatively unimpeded accumulation of society-speciﬁc
human capital and conferred Malthusian returns in terms of population density during the agricul-
tural stage of development. Section 3.2, on the other hand, provides evidence demonstrating the
long-run beneﬁts of cultural diﬀusion in the promotion of innovation and, thereby, in fostering the
transition from agriculture to industry.
16See also the recent study by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005). These ﬁndings, however, have commonly been
misinterpreted as implying that diversity is harmful for growth, which is not necessarily the case, as established by
Lian and Oneal (1997). Moreover, based on the notion that some sociopolitical institutions are more conducive to
harmony than others, Collier (2000, 2001) has argued that ethnic fragmentation should be less disruptive in more
pluralistic societies. The studies of Collier and Gunning (1999), Easterly (2001) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005)
have indeed provided some empirical validation along these lines.
93.1 Isolation, Assimilation and Malthusian Prosperity
The historical record on the experience of Chinese civilization throughout the agricultural stage of
development is broadly consistent with the hypothesis of this research regarding the links between
relative isolation from cross-cultural contact, cultural stability and Malthusian prosperity. It has
long been argued by historians (e.g., Cressey, 1934; Elvin, 1973) that the remarkable stability and
unity of Chinese civilization, that has remained culturally homogenous for some four thousand
years, was due, in large part, to it’s geographic isolation from the civilizations of India and the
Western world in ancient times. China’s location in the extreme eastern quarter of the Eurasian
l a n d m a s sa sw e l la si t ’ sn a t u r a lb a r r i e r ss u c ha st h eH i m a l a y a s ,t h eT i a nS h a na n dA l t a ym o u n t a i n
ranges, the Taklamakan and Gobi deserts, and the Paciﬁc Ocean ensured that, throughout most of
it’s early history, China had relatively infrequent exposure to cultural inﬂuence from other advanced
civilizations. Indeed, the origin of the sinocentric notion of China as the “Middle Kingdom”, or the
center of human civilization, is often attributed to it’s early isolation from cross-cultural contact
(Cressey, 1934). The lower geographical vulnerability to cultural diﬀusion therefore permitted an
unimpeded accumulation of society-speciﬁc human capital in China as manifested in the Confucian
traditions of ﬁlial piety and reverence for highly-codiﬁed social hierarchies. The intergenerational
transmission of society-speciﬁc human capital was further enhanced in China by such institutions as
the world’s oldest civil service examination system, and by technological inventions such as paper-
making and printing, all of which were instrumental for the preservation and eﬃcient dissemination
of Confucian ideology.
Despite the natural insulation oﬀered by China’s geographical barriers, historical evidence
demonstrates some major instances of external cultural inﬁltration in China as exempliﬁed by the
introduction of Buddhism from India during the Han dynasty (206BCE-220CE), and by the Mongol
and Manchu invasions in the 13th and 17th centuries. Nevertheless, in each of these instances
the force of assimilation assured relatively minimal disruptions to the long-standing sociocultural
traditions of Chinese civilization. For example, by the time Buddhism gained prominence as one of
the major state religions in China during the Tang dynasty (618CE-907CE), it had already been
infused with existing Chinese philosophies, particularly Taoism, and was being disseminated in a
distinctly sinicized form known as Ch’an (Zen) Buddhism. Subsequently, during the Song dynasty
(960CE-1279CE), elements of Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism were successfully synthesized
to produce the reconstituted philosophy of Neo-Confucianism, which remained the orthodox state
doctrine until the end of the Chinese imperial system (Ch’en, 1964). Moreover, the historical record
on the Yuan (Mongol) dynasty (1279CE-1368CE) as well as the Qing (Manchu) dynasty (1644CE-
1912CE) indicates that the nomadic steppe invaders of China, especially the Manchus, were largely
absorbed into the existing sociocultural fabric of Chinese civilization, with the conquerors ruling
almost entirely in the well-established Confucian tradition (Ho, 1967).
Historical evidence coming from some of the most prosperous dynastic periods of Chinese
civilization, encompassing the Han, Tang and Song dynasties, is consistent with the link between
10the intense accumulation of society-speciﬁc human capital and higher Malthusian returns in the
proposed theory. While agrarian technological progress, such as the introduction of iron plough-
ing techniques during the Han period or the state promotion of early-ripening rice strains by the
Song, undoubtedly contributed to the greater Malthusian prosperity of these periods (Needham and
Bray, 1984; Elvin, 1973), the evidence is also suggestive of higher demographic returns to enhanced
society-speciﬁc human capital. In particular, the society-speciﬁc human capital promoting institu-
tion of the civil service examination system was established by the Han dynasty and reﬁned during
the Tang and Song periods (Fairbank, 1992). Further, technologies like paper-making and printing
that signiﬁcantly enhanced the dissemination and perpetuation of Confucian philosophies were also
invented and improved upon in these eras (Needham and Tsuen-Hsuin, 1985). Interestingly, as
depicted in Figure 1, the Han, Tang and Song dynastic eras are also associated with periods of
progressive growth in the population density of China. The Song dynasty, in particular, witnessed
an unprecedented demographic explosion occurring between the 11th and 12th centuries when the








































































































































Figure 1: The Time Path of Population in Dynastic China, 400BCE-1800CE
(Source: McEvedy and Jones, 1978)
11While the homogenizing force of assimilation ultimately ensured the successful sinicization of
external inﬂuences throughout China’s history, the evidence on population recession during episodes
of foreign cultural inﬂux accords well with the proposed hypothesis in terms of the disruptive eﬀects
of heterogeneity on Malthusian returns. For example, the collapse of the powerful Han dynasty
ushered in nearly four centuries of cultural instability and fragmentation. The period was marred
by civil wars during the Three Kingdoms era (220CE-280CE), and by relatively minor but frequent
nomadic invasions, forcing the southward migration of the Jin dynasty (265CE-420CE), which
eventually led to further social disunity during the turbulent period of the Northern and Southern
dynasties (420CE-589CE) (see, e.g., Gernet, 1982). In line with the theory of this research, the
unstable environment of this era, that also experienced an increase in religious heterogeneity with
the rise of Buddhist thought and practices at the expense of Confucian ideology, saw about a 20%
decline in China’s population.17
Further evidence on the detrimental eﬀects of cultural heterogeneity, that introduces higher
ineﬃciencies in the intergenerational transmission of society-speciﬁc human capital according to the
proposed hypothesis, is provided by the demographic trends in the aftermath of the Mongol and
Manchu invasions of imperial China. As depicted in Figure 1, while the recovery of the population
occurred over the course of only 50 years following the Manchu invasion, it took about three times
longer for the population to regain the level that existed prior to the Mongol invasion.18 Although
this discrepancy is due, in part, to the greater devastation inﬂi c t e db yt h eM o n g o l s ,t h ed i ﬀerence
in the extent to which these groups were assimilated into the sociocultural traditions of Chinese
civilization is also regarded as a contributing factor. Indeed, the relatively lower instability resulting
from the establishment of the Qing dynasty has been attributed to the fact that, as vassals of the
preceding Ming dynasty (1368CE-1644CE), the Manchus, unlike their Mongol counterparts four
centuries earlier, were already highly sinicized by the time of conquest (Ho, 1967).
Following the disruptions associated with the Mongol invasion, China embarked on a trajec-
tory of rapid demographic expansion that lasted well into the modern era. The population doubled
from about 80 million to 160 million in the Ming era and tripled under the Qing dynasty, reaching
over 430 million by the mid-19th century (McEvedy and Jones, 1978). This monumental growth is
17It is interesting to note that processes leading to greater cultural heterogeneity were also associated with declining
population density over this period in Europe. Following the height of prosperity under the Roman Empire, which
represented 36 million European subjects at around 200CE, the population declined to 26 million by 600CE and only
climbed to about 29 million by 800CE, representing an overall decline of 19% across six centuries (McEvedy and
Jones, 1978). While climatic downturns have been held partially responsible for this decline, the fact that this period
also witnessed increased cultural instability and heterogeneity resulting from the “Barbarian Invasions” is supportive
of the hypothesis set forth in this paper. To elaborate, the ﬁrst phase of this migration period (300CE-500CE) saw
the movement of various Germanic peoples into areas of the former Roman empire (e.g. the Ostrogoths in Italy, the
Franks and Visigoths in France and Spain, and the Angles and Saxons in Britain) while the second phase (500CE-
700CE) comprised the migration of Slavic tribes, particularly the Bulgars, into Eastern Europe in the 7th century as
well as the invasion of the Iberian peninsula by the Arabs in the 8th century (McNeill, 1963).
18The depiction of smooth demographic downturns during episodes of invasion in Figure 1 is, of course, entirely
a by-product of the unavailability of suﬃcient data points. It is more likely that these nomadic invasions inﬂicted
negative demographic “shocks” with the population expansion regimes of the preceding periods lasting just until the
onset of the conquests.
12partly attributable to an increase in food supply resulting from the introduction of “New World”
crops, such as maize and sweet potatoes, and the spread of innovative Song period cultivation
methods like multiple-cropping that led to substantially higher yields (Deng, 1993). Beyond agrar-
ian technological progress, the relatively high degree of cultural and institutional stability of the
Ming and Qing periods are also considered to be signiﬁcant factors contributing to the population
expansion during this era. Consistent with the hypothesis of this research regarding the Malthusian
returns to enhanced society-speciﬁc human capital, Confucian ideology was more widespread in this
period of China’s history than ever before (Chow, 1994; Elman, 2000). The state-imposed isolation
throughout most of the Ming-Qing era further ensured that traditional Chinese culture was almost
impervious to external inﬂuence during this period. More schools in both rural and urban areas
were established as the cost of education fell with technological improvements in printing while
the number of academies preparing candidates for the civil service examination multiplied. The
publishing of Neo-Confucian texts ﬂourished and the period saw a general increase in ideological
literacy, thereby, strengthening the unique cultural uniformity of Chinese civilization that remained
largely unchanged through the beginning of the modern era.
3.2 Diﬀusion, Innovation and the Transition to Industry
The proposed theory suggests that a society’s exposure to cultural diﬀusion, which leads to greater
cultural heterogeneity through the introduction of external cultural inﬂuences, played a signiﬁcant
role in the promotion of innovation and technological creativity throughout it’s history. In line
with this hypothesis, both creativity researchers and historians have long stressed the important
link between cultural diversity and creative ﬂorescence. It has been suggested, for example, that
the “exposure to diﬀerent and even contrasting cultural stimuli” is indeed a fundamental “creativo-
genic factor” (Arieti, 1976, p. 320) and that “a [cultural] milieu [of diﬀerent ideas, beliefs and
patterns] contains richer material for a new synthesis or creative combinations than a cultural mi-
lieu of monotonous stereotypes” (Sorokin, 1947, p. 542). Moreover, the historical record of world
civilization demonstrates that many societies had experienced a surge in creativity after having
been exposed to foreign ideas and peoples (see, e.g., Toynbee, 1957; McNeill, 1963). The Golden
Age of Hellenistic civilization in Greece, for instance, is thought to have occurred as a result of the
diﬀusion of diverse ideas from the civilizations of Egypt, Persia and Mesopotamia that culminated
to a new creative synthesis. In addition, the European Renaissance of the 12th century, that ul-
timately paved the way to the Scientiﬁc Revolution of the 17th century, is historically attributed
to the diﬀusion of scientiﬁc thought and philosophies resulting directly from cross-cultural contact
between Europe and the Islamic world (Sarton, 1927; Sarton, 1931).
Beyond the history of Western civilization and consistent with the generality of the proposed
hypothesis, evidence on the link between cultural diﬀusion and innovation is present in the historical
record of Asian civilizations as well. In particular, the spread of Buddhism to China from India
initiated a period of intellectually productive exchange between the two civilizations that lasted
13several centuries (see, e.g., Ch’en, 1964; Gernet, 1982). The returns arising from this diﬀusion
are best exempliﬁed by scientiﬁcp r o g r e s si nC h i n a ,p a r t i c u l a r l yi nt h eﬁelds of astronomy and
mathematics, during the Tang dynasty. Chinese scholars of this period, most of them Buddhist
monks who were familiar with Sanskrit, are known to have translated the Indian literature on
mathematics and, in the process, introduced the Hindu decimal system in China.19
Further evidence on the innovation promoting eﬀects of cultural diﬀusion comes from a so-
ciometric study by Simonton (1997) that applied generational time-series analysis to detect whether
cultural cross-fertilization and the inﬂux of alien ideas had a positive inﬂuence on national achieve-
ment in Japan over the period spanning CE 580-1940. Using a sample of 1803 eminent Japanese
ﬁgures grouped into 20-year generations, together with time-series data on various measures of
openness to extracultural inﬂuence (such as the number of foreign immigrants who left a mark on
Japanese history and the number of eminent Japanese who travelled abroad or studied under for-
eigners), the research found some signiﬁcant cross-lagged correlations between creative achievement
and cultural openness to the non-Japanese world.20
Historical evidence coming from the Golden Age of Islamic civilization is also consistent
with the hypothesis of this research regarding the association of innovative activity with cultural
heterogeneity. At the height of Islam under the Abbasid Caliphate (750CE-1258CE), the city of
Baghdad was one of the largest and most cosmopolitan in the world, representing a highly diverse
population composed of Muslims, Jews, Christians and polytheistic adherents from various parts of
a vast empire encompassing North Africa, the MiddleE a s ta n dC e n t r a lA s i a .M o r e o v e r ,i nl i n ew i t h
the proposition that “the point of junction of various cultural streams supplies a larger number of
the elements necessary for a new creation” (Sorokin, 1947, p. 542), Baghdad was also the center of
international scholarly achievement in the High Middle Ages (Nasr, 1968). Building on the scientiﬁc
traditions of the Greek and Hindu civilizations, eminent ﬁgures from diverse religious and ethnic
backgrounds, such as the Persians Al-Khwarizmi and Ibn Sina (Avicenna), the Nestorian Hunayn
ibn Ishaq and the Sabean Thabit ibn Qurra (Thebit) to name a few, made several signiﬁcant
contributions in the ﬁelds of mathematics, astronomy, medicine and chemistry (Sarton, 1927). As
noted by historians in recognition of the returns from cultural heterogeneity, “the fusion of Indian
and perhaps Babylonian with Hellenistic ideas stimulated fresh discoveries and the development
of some important scientiﬁc devices [in this period]” (McNeill, 1963, p. 438). Nonetheless, while
these accomplishments were being further expanded and improved upon in Europe during the
12th and 13th centuries, Islamic civilization ultimately declined into intellectual stagnation by the
beginning of the early modern era. Consistent with the arguments of the proposed theory, creativity
19One of the many intellectual products of this cultural diﬀusion regime was the Buddhist monk Yi Xing, identiﬁed
as “the greatest Chinese mathematician and astronomer of his time” (Needham, 1956, p. 427), who made signiﬁcant
contributions in combinatorics and employed Indian trigonometry for advances in calendrical calculations.
20For instance, the number of eminent Japanese ﬁg u r e si nm e d i c i n ei ng e n e r a t i o nt was found to have a signiﬁcant
correlation of 0.27 with foreign travel in generation t − 2 while achievements in the spheres of business and religion
were contemporaneously correlated with a composite measure of outside inﬂuence, possessing signiﬁcant correlation
coeﬃcients of 0.25 and 0.5 respectively (Simonton, 1997).
14researchers and historians (e.g., Simonton, 1997; Landes, 1998) have attributed this descent in
innovative activity to an increase in cultural homogeneity resulting from a deliberate resistance to
the inﬂux of new ideas from the non-Islamic world.
Finally, the examples of migrant minority groups, particularly within Europe in the 16th and
17th centuries, that conferred substantial economic gains to their host societies provide additional
documented evidence in support of the proposed hypothesis.21 Historical studies on the signiﬁcant
economic eﬀects of the Protestant migrations in Europe during this period suggest that these
migrant groups “frequently transplanted new ideologies and attitudes towards economic activity as
well as widely diversiﬁed technical knowledge” (Scoville, 1951, p. 350). Some of these inﬂuential
migratory waves include the movement of Flemish, Walloon and Dutch Protestants from the Low
Countries to England, Holland and Switzerland in the late 16th century, and the migration of the
French Huguenots to England, Ireland, Prussia and elsewhere as a result of events following the
revocation of the Edict of Nantes by Louis XIV in 1685. Indeed, historical records demonstrate that
the Protestant migrations of the late 16th century were associated with notable improvements in
several industries, including textiles, glass-making and printing, as well as the introduction of new
agricultural practices in the host countries. Commenting on the extraordinary impact of the Dutch
Protestant migrations, Scoville (1951, p. 355) has argued that “it could not have been entirely
fortuitous that England and Holland in particular, and to a lesser extent Switzerland, experienced
a marked acceleration in their economic and industrial growth at about the same time that the
refugees were arriving.” Evidence of similar eﬀects resulting from the French Huguenot migrations
comes, for example, from Ireland where substantial developments in textile manufacturing resulted
in a 16-fold increase in the country’s linen exports between 1700 and 1750 (Scoville, 1951).
4 The Basic Structure of the Model
Consider a perfectly competitive overlapping-generations economy in the process of development
where economic activity extends over inﬁnite discrete time.
4.1 Cultural Assimilation and Cultural Diﬀusion
Individuals are characterized by a cultural trait that determines their attitude towards the prevailing
cultural norms in the economy. They can be either conformist or nonconformist with respect to
21Another documented example of the beneﬁcial role of minorities comes from the history of the Jewish community
in Islamic Spain under the Caliphate of Córdoba in the 10th and 11th centuries. During this period, typically referred
to as the Golden Age of Al Andalus, the Sephardic Jewry contributed signiﬁcantly to the economic and commercial
fabric of Islamic Spain, specializing in a diverse set of skilled occupations and playing a dominant role in both local and
foreign trade (Ashtor, 1973; Botticini and Eckstein, 2006). In addition, members of the Jewish community also held
important state oﬃces, as exempliﬁed by Hasdai ibn Shaprut who was an appointed court physician and counselor
to the Caliph Abd ar-Rahman III. Interestingly, consistent with the link between cultural heterogeneity and creative
activity in the proposed hypothesis, this period also witnessed a surge in diverse intellectual accomplishments, typiﬁed
by the works of such inﬂuential scholars as the Muslim physician Ibn Rushd (Averroes) and the Jewish philosopher
Moshe ben Maimon (Maimonides).
15the prevailing culture. Cultural traits are transmitted intergenerationally. In the absence of forces
operating on these traits, individuals possess their parental cultural dispositions and the fraction
of nonconformists in society remains constant over time. However, individuals are subjected to
two cultural forces that generate opposing eﬀects on the fraction of nonconformists in the adult
population: cultural assimilation and cultural diﬀusion. Cultural assimilation represents cultural
changes due to internal forces that operate towards the homogenization of traits and, thus, reduces
the fraction of nonconformists in society. Cultural diﬀusion, in contrast, represents cultural changes
due to external forces (e.g., the inﬂuence of a nearby foreign culture) that increases the heterogeneity
of traits and, thus, raises the fraction of nonconformists in society.22
Due to the forces of cultural assimilation, individuals born to nonconformist parents deviate
with probability σ ∈ (0,1) from their parental trait and become conformists. Hence, a proportion
σ of the fraction of nonconformists, ω, adopt a conformist disposition in the next period, with the
remaining proportion, (1 − σ), maintaining nonconformism. On the other hand, due to the forces
of cultural diﬀusion, which reﬂect the geographically determined vulnerability of the domestic
culture to foreign cultural inﬂuences, individuals who are born to conformist parents, deviate with
probability µ ∈ (0,1) from their parental disposition to adopt the nonconformist trait present in
the environment.23 Consequently, a proportion µ of the fraction of conformists, (1 − ω), become
nonconformists in the next period.
The steady-state fraction of nonconformists is therefore ω =( 1− σ)ω + µ(1 − ω),w h i c h
implies that
ω = µ/(σ + µ) ≡ ω(µ,σ),( 1 )
where ∂ω/∂µ>0 and ∂ω/∂σ < 0.N a m e l y ,ω is increasing in the degree of geographical vulnera-
bility to cultural diﬀusion, µ, and decreasing in the intensity of cultural assimilation, σ.
4.2 Production
In every period, the economy produces a single homogenous good in a rural (agricultural) sector
and, possibly, in a manufacturing (industrial) sector, employing labor and land in the production
process. Labor is supplied inelastically by households and evolves over time at the endogenously
determined rate of population growth. The supply of land, however, is exogenously determined
and remains constant over time.24 In early stages of development, the manufacturing sector is not
22Alternatively, the diﬀusion process can be equivalently considered in terms of members of a foreign population
replacing a fraction of the domestic population, where the foreigners are, by deﬁnition, nonconformists vis-a-vis the
domestic sociocultural norms. In the context of the Malthusian regime, this could occur as a result of foreign invasions
of the domestic population.
23It is plausibly assumed that individuals in the Malthusian regime did not envision the eventual occurrence of the
Industrial Revolution and the importance of diversity for an earlier transition to industry. Hence, the evolution of
cultural traits as described do not reﬂect a strategic choice by individuals, but rather the operation of the inevitable
forces of cultural assimilation and cultural diﬀusion.
24T h ep r e s e n c eo faﬁxed factor implies that there are diminishing returns to labor in the rural sector, an essential
ingredient for the emergence of a stable Malthusian equilibrium in early stages of development.
16economically viable and production is conducted exclusively in the rural sector. However, due to
its relatively faster rate of growth in productivity, the manufacturing sector ultimately becomes
economically viable and both sectors are jointly operated in later stages of development.
4.2.1 Production in the Rural and Manufacturing Sectors
The output produced in the rural sector in period t, Y R
t , is governed by a Cobb-Douglas, constant-
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where LR
t is the amount of labor employed in the rural sector in period t, X i st h ea m o u n to f
land, and AR
t is the level of rural productivity in period t. For simplicity the amount of land is
normalized such that X =1 .
The output of the manufacturing sector in period t, Y M
t , is determined by a linear, constant-
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where LM
t is the amount of labor employed in the manufacturing sector in period t,a n dAM
t is the
level of manufacturing productivity in period t.
The total labor force in period t, Lt, is allocated between the two sectors and, therefore,
LR
t + LM
t = Lt,( 4 )
where Lt > 0 in every period t.
As will become apparent, in early stages of development, when the productivity of manu-
facturing labor, AM
t , is low relative to that of rural labor, output is produced using only the rural
technology. However, in later stages of development, when AM
t rises suﬃciently relative to the
productivity of rural labor, the manufacturing technology becomes economically viable.
4.2.2 Factor Prices and Aggregate Labor Allocation
Producers operate in perfectly competitive markets for labor and the ﬁnal good. In the absence
of property rights to land, the return to land is zero and workers in the rural sector receive their










t is the wage rate of rural labor in period t.25
25The modeling of the production side is based on two simplifying assumptions. First, capital is not an input in
the production process and, second, the return to land is zero. Since the fundamental mechanism of the emergence
17The inverse demand for labor in the manufacturing sector, given (3), is
wM
t = AM
t ,( 6 )
where wM
t is the wage rate of manufacturing labor in period t.
As follows from (5), the inverse demand for labor in the rural sector increases without
bound as employment decreases in that sector. This, coupled with the ﬁnite productivity of labor
in the manufacturing sector, implies that the rural sector will be operative in every period. The
manufacturing sector, in contrast, will be operative if and only if labor productivity in this sector
exceeds the marginal productivity of labor in the rural sector when the entire labor force is employed
in the rural sector. Moreover, perfect labor mobility between the two sectors implies that the
sectoral wage rates will be equal as long as both sectors are used in production.
The following lemma and its associated corollary, respectively, establish conditions on the
level of manufacturing productivity and, equivalently, on the size of the working population under
which the manufacturing technology becomes economically viable.
Lemma 1 (The Manufacturing Productivity Threshold for the Economic Viability of the Manu-
facturing Sector) There exists a threshold level of manufacturing productivity, ˆ AM
t , such that the













Proof. Follows from (5)-(6) and the perfect mobility of labor between sectors, which assures that
workers will start gaining employment in the manufacturing sector if their productivity in that
sector, AM
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the entire labor force, Lt, is employed in the rural sector. ¤
Corollary 1 (The Population Threshold for the Economic Viability of the Manufacturing Sector)
Given AM
t > 0, there exists a unique threshold size of the working population, ˆ Lt, such that the














Let θt ∈ (0,1] denote the fraction of the economy’s labor force employed in the rural sector
in period t, i.e., θt ≡ LR
t /Lt. As follows from Lemma 1 and depicted in Figure 2, if AM
t < ˆ AM
t ,t h e
of sustained growth explored in this paper focuses on the role of knowledge accumulation, rather than that of capital
accumulation, the absence of capital from the production process is a natural simplifying assumption. One could have
assumed, alternatively, that the economy uses capital as a factor input in both sectors, is small and open to a world
capital market where the interest rate is constant, and that land is collectively owned with the proceeds distributed
lump sum to the population. In this case, the quantity of capital would be ﬁx e ds oa st oe q u a l i z ei t sm a r g i n a lp r o d u c t
to the world interest rate, whereas the price of land would evolve to ensure that the total return on land (rent plus
price appreciation) would also equal the world interest rate. Allowing for capital accumulation and property rights
over land in a closed economy context would complicate the model to the point of intractability.
18entire labor force will be employed in the rural sector and the wage rate in the economy, wt,w i l lb e
the associated wage rate in the rural sector, wR
t . However, if AM
t ≥ ˆ AM
t , the manufacturing sector
will be operational and the perfect mobility of workers between sectors will assure that wt = wR
t
= wM
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Figure 2: The Labor Market Equilibrium Conditional on the Level of Productivity
of Labor in the Manufacturing Sector
Consistent with the historical path of economic development, where agriculture unequivo-
cally precedes industry, it is assumed that the manufacturing sector is not economically viable in
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194.3 Individuals
In every period t, a generation comprising a continuum of Lt economically identical individuals
joins the labor force. Individuals, as described earlier, may exhibit variation in a given cultural
trait (i.e., in their stance as a cultural conformist versus a nonconformist), thus, giving rise to a
certain cultural composition of the generation in terms of this trait. As will become apparent, while
the cultural composition of the labor force does not inﬂuence the economy’s production activities
in any manner within a given period, it does aﬀect the dynamic path of the economy in the process
of development.26
Reproduction occurs asexually and each individual, therefore, has a single parent. Members
of generation t live for two periods. In the ﬁrst period of life (childhood), t − 1, individuals are
raised by their parents who face a ﬁxed cost of child-rearing for every child in the household.27 In
the second period of life (parenthood), t, individuals are endowed with one unit of time, which they
allocate entirely to labor force participation.
4.3.1 Preferences and Constraints
The preferences of members of generation t (those born in period t−1)a r ed e ﬁned over consumption
as well as the number of their children. They are represented by the utility function
ut =( ct)
γ (nt)
1−γ ; γ ∈ (0,1), (9)
where ct is consumption, and nt is the number of children of individual t. The individual’s utility
function is, therefore, strictly monotonically increasing and strictly quasi-concave, satisfying the
conventional boundary conditions, which ensure that, for any positive level of income, there exists
an interior solution to the utility maximization problem.
Let τ > 0 be the cost (in terms of the consumption good) faced by a member of generation t
for raising a child. Income from labor force participation is divided between expenditure on children
(at a real cost of τ per child) and consumption. Hence, the budget constraint faced by a member
of generation t is
ct + τnt ≤ wt,( 1 0 )
where wt is the labor income of individual t, as given by (8).
26To be speciﬁc, cultural traits themselves have no eﬀect of the individual sectoral productivity of the members of
a given generation. However, the distribution of traits within a given generation aﬀects the sectoral productivity of
subsequent generations.
27This corresponds to the assumption that there exists some market, external to the economy, from where parents
can simply purchase child-rearing services (at a ﬁxed real cost per child) without having to incur any opportunity cost
of time (in terms of labor force participation) for raising their children. An alternative modeling strategy based on a
time cost associated with child-rearing would not aﬀect the qualitative results of the model so long as technological
progress reduces the amount of time required to raise a child.
204.3.2 Optimization
Members of generation t choose the number of their children and, therefore, their own consumption
so as to maximize their utility subject to the budget constraint. Substituting (10) into (9), the
optimization problem for a member of generation t reduces to
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which, consistent with one of the fundamental features of a Malthusian environment, yields the
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t ≥ ˆ AM
t .
(13)
5 The Time Paths of the Macroeconomic Variables
The time paths of the macroeconomic variables are captured by the dynamics of factor productivity
in each of the rural and manufacturing sectors, AR
t and AM
t , as well as the evolution of the size of the
working population, Lt. The evolution of factor productivity in each sector is, in turn, determined
by the accumulation of knowledge, and aﬀected by the size and the cultural composition of the
adult (working) population.
5.1 The Dynamics of Knowledge
In every period t, members of the adult generation in the economy develop new knowledge, which
advances the productivity of society in two dimensions. First, new knowledge upgrades the existing
production technologies, which expands society’s production possibility frontier. Second, it permits
improvements in the organization of society so that production can occur closer to the technological
frontier. The process of knowledge creation is fueled by the size of the adult generation, Lt, via its
eﬀect on the supply of, the demand for, and the diﬀusion of ideas, as well as through its enhancement
of trade and the division of labor. Furthermore, the knowledge creation process is complemented
by the the degree of cultural heterogeneity in society, Ω, which is represented by the product of the
conformist and nonconformist fractions of the adult population, i.e., Ω = ω(1 − ω). The higher
is the cultural heterogeneity of the adult generation, the greater is the amount of new knowledge
produced in the economy.
21The advancement in the stock of knowledge, ∆κt, between its level in period t, κt,a n di t s
level in period t +1 , κt+1, is, therefore,
∆κt ≡ κt+1 − κt = κ(Lt;Ω),( 1 4 )
where ∂κ(Lt;Ω)/∂Lt > 0, ∂κ(Lt;Ω)/∂Ω > 0, ∂2κ(Lt;Ω)/(∂Lt∂Ω) ≥ 0, and the initial stock of
knowledge, κ0 > 0,i sg i v e n .
The change in the stock of knowledge between periods t and t +1 , ∆κt, is assumed to be
subject to diminishing marginal returns in the size of the economy’s labor force in period t.I n
particular, it is taken to be of the form
∆κt = ω(1 − ω)Lλ
t ; λ ∈ (0,1). (15)
5.2 The Dynamics of Sectoral Productivity
The level of productivity in each of the rural and manufacturing sectors, AR
t and AM
t ,i sg o v e r n e d
by the technological level in that sector as well as by the level of society-speciﬁc human capital
(i.e., attitudes of trust, obedience, discipline, and social cohesion), which determines the extent
of society’s ability to take advantage of the technological frontier. Productivity in each sector is
inﬂuenced positively by technological progress, which occurs via the incorporation of new knowledge
into existing technologies and the application of new knowledge in improving the organization of
society. Sectoral productivity, however, is inﬂuenced negatively by cultural nonconformism, which
obstructs the transmission of society-speciﬁc human capital across generations.
The degree of nonconformism in society has an ambiguous eﬀe c to nt h el e v e lo fp r o d u c t i v i t y
in each sector. On the one hand, nonconformism stimulates knowledge accumulation, advancing
society’s technological frontier (through either innovation or the adoption of existing technologies)
and improving society’s ability to operate closer to this frontier. On the other hand, it introduces
disharmony in society, eroding society’s ability to transmit its society-speciﬁc human capital from
one generation to another. The evolution of factor productivity in each sector is, thus, subject
to a fundamental trade-oﬀ whereby a larger fraction of nonconformists enhances productivity by
contributing to knowledge creation, while diminishing productivity via its detrimental eﬀect on the
intergenerational transmission of society-speciﬁc human capital.
The dynamics of productivity in the rural and manufacturing sectors are governed by the
same fundamental law of motion. In particular, productivity is enhanced by the creation of new
knowledge, ∆κt, and simultaneously diminished at a rate proportional to the fraction of noncon-
formists in society, ω,r e ﬂecting the deleterious eﬀect of nonconformism on the transmission of
society-speciﬁc human capital. However, the advancement of knowledge, in general, and the inven-
tion and adoption of new technologies, in particular, are more complementary to productivity in
the manufacturing sector as compared to the rural sector.28
28Knowledge is assumed to be a pure public good and is, therefore, nonrival and nonexcludable in terms of its
22The evolution of productivity in the manufacturing sector, between periods t and t +1 ,a s
follows from (15), is determined by
AM
t+1 =( 1− ω)AM
t + ω(1 − ω)Lλ
t AM




,( 1 6 )
where the initial level of manufacturing productivity, AM
0 > 0, is given. In particular, (1 − ω)AM
t
captures the erosion in productivity due to the disruptive eﬀect of nonconformism on the trans-
mission of society speciﬁc human capital, whereas ω(1 − ω)Lλ
t AM
t captures the advancement in
productivity due to the application of new knowledge to the existing level of technology.29
Similarly, the evolution of productivity in the rural sector, between periods t and t +1 ,i s
determined by
AR
t+1 =( 1− ω)AR










,( 1 7 )
where the initial level of rural productivity, AR
0 > 0,i sg i v e n ,a n d
β > 0 and λ + β < 1, (A2)
assuring a smaller degree of complementarity between the advancement of the knowledge frontier
and the existing stock of sector-speciﬁc productivity in the rural sector.
5.3 The Dynamics of Population Size
The size of the adult population (or labor force) in any period is determined by the size of the
preceding generation and its fertility rate. As follows from (13), the adult population size evolves
over time according to














if Lt < ˆ Lt
1−γ
τ AM




if Lt ≥ ˆ Lt,
(18)
where the initial size of the adult population, L0 > 0,i sg i v e n .
Hence, as long as the manufacturing sector is not economically viable (i.e., the labor force
Lt < ˆ Lt, or manufacturing productivity AM
t < ˆ AM
t ), population dynamics are governed by the level
of productivity in the rural sector as well as the size of the adult population. However, when both
sectors are active, the labor market equilibrium ensures that population dynamics are governed by
the level of productivity in the manufacturing sector and the size of the adult population.
applicability in the rural versus manufacturing sectors.
29As will become apparent, given the initial conditions of economies, TFP increases monotonically in the process
of development.
236 The Process of Development
This section examines the role of cultural factors in determining the characteristics of the Malthu-
sian equilibrium and the timing of the take-oﬀ from an epoch of Malthusian stagnation to a state
of sustained economic growth.30 The analysis demonstrates that, due to a greater eﬃciency in the
intergenerational transmission of society-speciﬁc human capital, a society that is predominantly
characterized by cultural assimilation ﬂourishes in the Malthusian regime, beneﬁting from a more
advanced agricultural technology and sustaining a higher population density. However, the associ-
ated lack of cultural diﬀusion delays the advancement of knowledge in this economy, hindering its
ability to shift to an industrial technology and, thereby, escape Malthusian stagnation to enter a
state of sustained economic growth.
The process of economic development, given the fraction ω of nonconformists in society as






t=0 that governs the evolution of
the productivity in the rural sector, AR
t , the productivity in the manufacturing sector, AM
t ,a n d
the size of adult population, Lt. Speciﬁcally, noting (16), (17) and (18), the dynamic path of the
economy is given by
⎧
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,a r es e tt o
satisfy assumption (A1).
6.1 The Dynamical System
The global analysis of the evolution of the economy from the agricultural to the industrial regime
is based on phase diagrams that describe the evolution of the system within the Malthusian epoch
as well as its endogenous transition to an industrialized economy. The analysis underlines the
role of the degree of cultural nonconformism in determining the characteristics of the Malthusian
equilibrium and the timing of the economy’s take-oﬀ to an industrial mode of production.
30Since reversals in economic performance are historically observed in the relatively earlier industrialization of
economies that under-performed in the pre-industrial stage of development, the analysis here focuses on the forces
that brought about industrialization, rather than the subsequent forces that led to the demographic transition and
the emergence of the modern growth regime. Clearly, one could employ the methodology advanced by Galor and
Weil (2000) and Galor (2005) and, thereby, generate the entire developmental path from Malthusian stagnation to
the demographic transition and beyond. This additional complication, however, will not generate any new insights
on the role of cultural factors in bringing about historical reversals in economic performance.





plane, conditional on the level of AM
t . The evolution of AM
t generates a phase transition of
the dynamical system and brings about a qualitative change that is associated with industrialization
and the take-oﬀ to a state of sustained economic growth.
Each of the phase diagrams is based on three geometric elements that are instrumental
for the determination of motion within the system: the Conditional Malthusian Frontier, which
separates the regions in which the economy is agricultural from those where it is industrial; the AA





for which the productivity in the rural sector is
constant; and the LL locus, which denotes the set of all pairs for which, conditional on the latency
of the manufacturing sector, the size of the adult population is constant.
6.1.1 The Conditional Malthusian Frontier





space, that separates the
regions where the economy is exclusively agricultural from those where it is industrial as well. Once
the economy’s trajectory crosses this frontier, industrialization takes place.





such that, for a
given level of manufacturing productivity, AM
t , the entrepreneurs in the economy are indiﬀerent
as to whether to operate the manufacturing sector or not. Following Corollary 1, the Conditional
Malthusian Frontier, MM|AM
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Proof. Follows immediately from (20), Corollary 1, and diﬀerentiation. ¤






space where, as follows from Corollary 1, the region strictly below the frontier is
associated with production using only the rural technology and the region (weakly) above the







t increases in the process of development.
Lemma 3 (The Dynamics of Population Size with respect to the Conditional Malthusian Frontier)
Given AR
t > 0 and AM







Lt+1 − Lt T 0 if and only if AM
t T τ
1−γ.
25Proof. Follows immediately from (18). ¤







space), the evolution of the size of the adult population
depends on the level of AM
t relative to a critical level, τ/(1 − γ). In particular, when manufacturing
productivity is below the threshold, τ/(1 − γ), the wage rate in the economy is too low to sustain
fertility beyond replacement so the adult population declines in size over time, whereas, if AM
t
is above the critical threshold, then the wage rate is high enough to maintain fertility above the
replacement level so the size of the adult population increases over time.
6.1.2 The AA Locus





such that the level of rural productivity, AR
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is obtained from the algebraic manipulation
of (17) under AR
t+1 = AR
t . The remainder follows directly from diﬀerentiation, while observing
assumption (A2). ¤
Corollary 2 (The Dynamics of Rural Productivity with respect to the AA Locus) Given AR
t > 0
and ω ∈ (0,1),
AR
t+1 − AR





Hence, the AA locus, as depicted in Figures 3-4, is a strictly convex, upward sloping curve





space. Further, an increase in ω pushes the locus closer towards the
Lt-axis. Moreover, AR
t grows over time above the AA locus (i.e., for values of Lt that, for a given
AR
t , are above the steady-state level), since the adult population here is suﬃciently large to ensure
that the associated advancement of the knowledge frontier fosters technology accumulation beyond
the eroding forces of cultural nonconformism on productivity. Below the AA locus (i.e., for values
of Lt that, for a given AR
t , are below the steady-state level), the advancement of the knowledge
frontier is not suﬃcient to overcome the eroding eﬀects of nonconformism on productivity, so AR
t
falls over time.
266.1.3 The LL Locus





such that, conditional on the latency of the












.( 2 2 )






























is obtained from the algebraic manipulation
of (18) under Lt+1 = Lt. The remainder follows immediately from diﬀerentiation. ¤
Corollary 3 (The Dynamics of Population Size with respect to the LL Locus) Given AR
t > 0 and
AM


















space. Lt grows over time below the LL locus since a suﬃciently high wage rate, that
results from a population that is smaller than the steady-state level, permits fertility to be above
replacement. Lt declines over time above the LL locus since a suﬃciently low wage rate, resulting
from a population that is larger than the steady-state level, dictates the fertility rate to be below





space, relative to the Conditional
Malthusian Frontier, MM|AM
t , is established in the following lemma.
Lemma 6 (The Position of the LL Locus relative to the Conditional Malthusian Frontier) Given
AM





























if and only if AM
t S τ
1−γ.










, as speciﬁed in
Corollary 1 and Lemma 5, respectively. ¤
Thus, for AM
t < τ/(1 − γ), the Conditional Malthusian Frontier, MM|AM
t ,i sl o c a t e da b o v e
the LL locus. However, the clockwise rotation of MM|AM
t , propelled by the growth of AM
t in the
process of development, eventually causes the two loci to coincide when AM
t = τ/(1 − γ),a n dt h e
Conditional Malthusian Frontier, MM|AM
t , subsequently drops below the LL locus.
27The critical level of AM
t , established in Lemma 3, that determines whether the size of adult
population in the region above the Conditional Malthusian Frontier is growing or declining over
time, therefore, also governs the position of MM|AM
t relative to the LL locus. As such, the growth
of AM
t through the critical level, τ/(1−γ), instigates a permanent change in the qualitative nature
of the system with respect to the global dynamics of the size of the adult population. This change
reﬂects the transition of the system from the Malthusian to the Post-Malthusian regime and is
summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 7 (The Dynamics of Population Size with respect to the LL Locus and the Conditional
Malthusian Frontier) Given AM
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and, for all Lt,
Lt+1 − Lt > 0.
Proof. Part (1) follows immediately from Lemmas 3 and 6, and Corollary 3. Part (2) follows from
the same results, while observing that above the Conditional Malthusian Frontier, Lt+1 −Lt > 0 if
AM
t > τ/(1 − γ) and if Lt is below the LL locus. ¤
6.1.4 The Phase Diagrams
The evolution of economic activity in the agricultural stage of development and in the transition to
the industrial stage is depicted in the phase diagrams in Figures 3-4. Figure 3 depicts early stages of
development where the economy is agricultural and characterized by Malthusian dynamics, whereas
28Figure 4 depicts the endogenous take-oﬀ to an industrial economy, characterized by an acceleration
in the growth rates of output per worker and population.
The Agricultural Stage of Development The dynamical system in the agricultural stage of
development, when productivity in the (latent) manufacturing sector, AM
t , is below the critical
level, τ/(1 − γ), is depicted in Figure 3.
As established in Lemma 7, the MM|AM
t frontier, in this stage, resides above the LL locus
and the dynamical system is characterized by a globally stable conditional Malthusian steady-state
equilibrium, (AR
ss,L ss), located at the point of intersection of the AA and LL loci. It follows from








,s p e c i ﬁed in Lemmas 4 and 5, respectively, that
the Malthusian steady-state values of productivity in the rural sector, AR
ss, and the size of the adult
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Figure 3: The Agricultural Stage of Development
29The dynamical system gravitates towards the steady-state equilibrium in a conventional
Malthusian fashion.31 Speciﬁcally, in the region above the LL locus but below MM|AM
t , the adult
population (employed exclusively in the rural sector) is suﬃciently large and, hence, the wage rate
suﬃciently small such that fertility is at sub-replacement levels. Thus, as depicted in the phase
diagram, the adult population in this region declines in size over time. However, below the LL
locus the adult population is suﬃciently small and the rural wage rate is, therefore, large enough to
ensure that the fertility rate is above replacement, implying that the adult population in this region
grows in size over time. Finally, in the region above MM|AM
t , it follows from Lemma 3 that the size
of the adult population falls over time, which eventually drops the economy below the Conditional
Malthusian Frontier. The industrial mode of production is, therefore, not sustainable in this stage
of development, with the economy ultimately converging to an agricultural regime, characterized
by a Malthusian equilibrium.
Given the discrete nature of the dynamical system, the trajectories implied by the phase
diagram in Figure 3 approximate the actual dynamic paths only if both state variables evolve
monotonically over time. The actual system, however, may be characterized by oscillatory conver-
gence to the conditional Malthusian steady-state equilibrium if at least one of the eigenvalues of the
system’s Jacobian matrix is negative (Galor, 2007). The trajectories in Figure 3 are, thus, drawn
under the assumption that the parametric condition in Lemma 8 holds so as to ensure that the
conditional dynamical system is locally nonoscillatory in the vicinity of the conditional Malthusian
steady-state. However, the qualitative aspects of analysis would not be altered even if oscillations
were to characterize the evolution of the Malthusian economy towards its steady-state, since this a
feature that appears to be present during the Malthusian epoch.32





,a r ef o r m a l l y
established in the following lemma by examining the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of the
conditional dynamical system evaluated at the steady-state equilibrium.
Lemma 8 (The Local Stability Properties of the Conditional Malthusian Steady-State) If (A2) is
satisﬁed and AM





,o ft h e
dynamical system in (19) is:
1. locally asymptotically stable; and
2. characterized by the local monotonic evolution of both state variables, AR
t and Lt,i fa n do n l y










































0 > 0 and L0 > 0, however, the non-trivial steady-state equilibrium is globally stable.
32See, for example, Galor (2005) and Lagerlöf (2006).
30has eigenvalues that are real and positive, i.e., if and only if
ω <
α
λ + α(1 − λ − β)
.
Proof. See Appendix. ¤
The Industrial Stage of Development The dynamical system in the industrial stage of devel-
opment, when manufacturing productivity, AM
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Figure 4: Industrialization and the Take-oﬀ
As established in Lemma 7, the MM|AM
t frontier, in this stage, resides below the LL locus
and the dynamical system changes qualitatively in relation to its characteristics in the agricultural
stage. The wage rate increases over time, permitting a continuous increase in the size of the adult
population, along with an increase in the growth rate of productivity and output per worker.
The Transition from Agriculture to Industry The transition from agriculture to industry
in the process of development is brought about by the growth of manufacturing productivity from
its initial level below the critical threshold, τ/(1 − γ), as depicted in Figure 3, to a level beyond
this threshold, as depicted in Figure 4.
31The transition from agriculture to industry, therefore, requires that the economy starts
with a mode of production that is exclusively agricultural. Hence, the initial level of manufacturing
productivity is assumed to satisfy
AM
0 < τ/(1 − γ).( A 3 )
Furthermore, to assure that industrial production ultimately becomes economically viable, it is
suﬃcient to assume that (latent) manufacturing productivity grows monotonically and eventually
exceeds the critical magnitude, τ/(1 − γ).
Let gt+1 denote the rate of productivity growth in the manufacturing sector between periods







= ω[(1 − ω)Lλ
t − 1] ≡ g(Lt,ω).( 2 5 )
In particular, noting (24), the improvement in productivity that takes place in the (latent) man-


















≡ gss (ω),( 2 6 )
where gss (0) = 0 and gss (1) = −1.
Lemma 9 (The Condition for Positivity of the Growth Rate of Manufacturing Productivity at the
Conditional Malthusian Steady-State) There exists some ω ∈ (0,1) such that
gss (ω) > 0 if and only if γ + τ < 1.
Proof. Necessity follows immediately from observing that, given ω ∈ (0,1),t h ep o s i t i v i t yo fgss
implies that (1 − γ)/τ > 1.F o r s u ﬃciency, given (1 − γ)/τ > 1, the proof follows trivially from
the continuity of gss as ω approaches 0 from above. ¤
Following Lemma 9, in order to permit society’s transition to an industrial economy for
at least some cultural compositions of society, ω, the sum of the parameters γ and τ is restricted
so as to ensure a positive rate of productivity growth in the (latent) manufacturing sector at the
conditional Malthusian steady-state equilibrium, i.e.,
γ + τ < 1.( A 4 )
Lemma 10 (The Properties of the Growth Rate of Manufacturing Productivity at the Conditional
Malthusian Steady-State)
321. Under (A4), there exists a unique ˆ ω ∈ (0,1) such that
gss (ω) T 0 if and only if ω S ˆ ω;
2. Under (A2) and (A4), dgss (0)/dω > 0,a n dt h e r ee x i s t sau n i q u e˜ ω ∈ (0,1) such that
dgss (˜ ω)/dω < 0 and d2gss (ω)/(dω)
2 S 0 if and only if ω S ˜ ω,
Proof. See Appendix. ¤
Corollary 4 (The Fraction of Cultural Nonconformists that Maximizes the Growth Rate of Man-
ufacturing Productivity at the Conditional Malthusian Steady-State) Under (A2) and (A4), there
exists a unique ω∗ ∈ (0,1) such that
dgss (ω)/dω T 0 if and only if ω S ω∗.
t ω  
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Figure 5:T h eE ﬀect of the Fraction of Cultural Nonconformists on the Growth
Rate of Manufacturing Productivity at the Conditional Malthusian Steady-State
The growth rate of manufacturing productivity at the conditional Malthusian steady-state
equilibrium, gss, has a unique interior root, ˆ ω,i nt h e(0,1) domain, and is positive (negative) for
all values of ω below (respectively, above) the root. Furthermore, as depicted in Figure 5, it has a
hump-shaped relationship with the fraction of cultural nonconformists in the adult population.33 In
particular, for a certain range of cultural compositions, i.e., for ω ∈ (0, ˆ ω), the productivity in the
33Without loss of generality, Figure 5 has been drawn under the implicit assumption that ˜ ω < ˆ ω. The general
hump-shaped relationship between gss and ω, however, holds regardless of whether the value of ω at the inﬂection
point, ˜ ω,i sb e l o w ,a b o v eo re q u a lt ot h er o o tv a l u e ,ˆ ω.
33(latent) manufacturing sector, at the conditional Malthusian steady-state equilibrium, increases
monotonically over time, making industrialization ultimately inevitable.
6.2 The Evolution of the Economy
The evolution of the economy is characterized by an early epoch of Malthusian stagnation, where
production is exclusively agricultural, and by an endogenous industrialization with a subsequent
take-oﬀ to a state of sustained economic growth.
6.2.1 The Agricultural Economy
In early stages of development, the productivity in the (latent) manufacturing sector, AM
t ,i sl o w
(satisfying assumptions (A1) and (A3)), and only the rural sector is operative. The dynamical
system, depicted in Figure 3, gravitates (monotonically or in Malthusian oscillations) towards a
globally stable conditional steady-state equilibrium, (AR
ss,L ss).
Since the adult population in this stage of development is employed exclusively in the rural
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which reﬂects the well-established Malthusian property that the long-run level of income per capita
is constant and independent of the level of technology. A higher level of productivity per worker is
simply counter-balanced by a larger size of the working population.
6.2.2 From Agriculture to Industry
The transition from agriculture to industry in the process of development is brought about by
the growth of productivity in the (latent) manufacturing sector. As manufacturing productivity
increases, the Conditional Malthusian Frontier, MM|AM






of Figure 3. The level of productivity in the manufacturing sector ultimately surpasses the critical
threshold, τ/(1 − γ), which drops the Conditional Malthusian Frontier below the LL locus, as
depicted in Figure 4.





space, is no longer characterized by a globally stable
conditional Malthusian steady-state. Speciﬁcally, the steady-state equilibrium ceases to act as an
attractor as soon as trajectories cross the Conditional Malthusian Frontier and the manufacturing
sector becomes active. The emergence of the manufacturing sector then places the economy on a
dynamic path where the state variables, AR
t and Lt, grow endogenously over time, and the growth
of manufacturing productivity drives the growth of income per worker.
346.3 Culture and Comparative Development
The eﬀect of culture on comparative development can be examined based on the eﬀect of cultural
composition on Malthusian equilibrium outcomes in the agricultural stage of development, and on
the timing of industrialization and the take-oﬀ to a state of sustained economic growth.
Proposition 1 (The Eﬀect of the Fraction of Cultural Nonconformists on the Equilibrium in the
Agricultural Stage of Development) Under (A2), as long as the economy remains exclusively agricul-
tural, an increase in the fraction of cultural nonconformists has an adverse eﬀect on the steady-state
levels of productivity in the rural sector and the size of the adult population, but has no eﬀect on
the steady-state level of income per capita, i.e., for all ω ∈ (0,1),
dAR
ss/dω < 0; dLss/dω < 0;
dyss/dω =0 .
Proof. Follows from diﬀerentiating (23), (24) and (27) with respect to ω, while noting (A2). ¤
Geometrically, as depicted in Figure 6, a higher value of ω causes the AA locus to reside





space, thereby, yielding lower steady-state levels of adult population
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Figure 6:T h eE ﬀect of an Increase in the Fraction of Cultural Nonconformists on
the Malthusian Equilibrium in the Agricultural Stage of Development
35Therefore, an economy that is characterized by a relatively higher proportion of cultural
nonconformists in its working population is also associated with a relatively inferior conditional
Malthusian steady-state, at least in terms of the level of rural productivity per worker and the
size of its working population. However, the long-run level of income per capita is unaﬀected by
the higher prevalence of cultural nonconformism since the resulting lower level of productivity per
worker is counter-balanced by a smaller size of the working population.
The inferiority of the conditional Malthusian steady-state in a society with a larger frac-
tion of cultural nonconformists stems from the fact that the adverse eﬀect of nonconformism on
the transmission of society-speciﬁc human capital outweighs its beneﬁcial role in the moderate ad-
vancement of rural productivity, via its contribution to cultural heterogeneity in the expansion of
the knowledge frontier.
The prevalence of cultural nonconformism, however, also has an eﬀect on the timing of
industrialization and, thus, on the take-oﬀ to a state of sustained economic growth. This eﬀect is
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (The Eﬀect of the Fraction of Cultural Nonconformists on the Timing of Indus-
trialization and the Take-oﬀ from Malthusian Stagnation) Consider an economy in a conditional
Malthusian steady-state equilibrium. Under (A2) and (A4), an increase in the fraction of cultural
nonconformists, as long as the fraction is not too large, has a beneﬁcial eﬀect on the timing of the
adoption of industry and, thus, on the timing of the take-oﬀ from Malthusian stagnation, i.e.,
dgss/dω R 0 if and only if ω Q ω∗.
Proof. Follows immediately from Corollary 4. ¤
Hence, productivity growth in the (latent) manufacturing sector at the conditional Malthu-
sian steady-state equilibrium is monotonically increasing in the nonconformist fraction of the adult
population up to a critical level ω∗, and monotonically decreasing thereafter.
The earlier take-oﬀ from the conditional Malthusian steady-state equilibrium by a society
with a larger, but still moderate, fraction of cultural nonconformists stems from the fact that
the beneﬁcial eﬀect of nonconformism on the advancement of knowledge, and, therefore, on the
advancement of industrial productivity relative to that in agriculture, outweighs its eroding eﬀect
on the intergenerational transmission of society-speciﬁc human capital. In contrast, if the fraction
of nonconformists is too large, an increase in the prevalence of nonconformism raises the ﬂow of
ideas but also increases the degree of anarchy in society, acutely disrupting the transmission of
society-speciﬁc human capital. The rate at which new ideas are implemented and productivity is
advanced in the economy is, therefore, diminished.
Following Propositions 1 and 2, variation in the moderate prevalence of cultural noncon-
formism across societies is associated with the phenomenon of overtaking. Speciﬁcally, a higher
prevalence of nonconformism generates an inferior economic outcome in the agricultural stage of
36development, but ultimately stimulates an earlier industrialization and, thus, an earlier take-oﬀ to
a state of sustained economic growth. As such, the cultural composition of societies can have a
profound eﬀect on their historical experience with regard to the process of development.
Corollary 5 (Cultural Nonconformism and Overtaking) Consider two societies indexed by i ∈
{C,E}. Suppose that society E is characterized by a higher prevalence of cultural nonconformism
and that ωC < ωE < ω∗,w h e r eωi is the fraction of cultural nonconformists in society i.S o c i e t y
E will then be characterized by an inferior productivity in the Malthusian regime, but will overtake
society C via an earlier take-oﬀ into the industrial regime.
6.4 Geography, Culture, and Comparative Development
The eﬀect of initial geographical conditions on comparative development can be examined based on
the eﬀects of geographical vulnerability to cultural diﬀu s i o no nM a l t h u s i a ne q u i l i b r i u mo u t c o m e s
in the agricultural stage of development, and on the timing of industrialization and the take-oﬀ to
a state of sustained economic growth.
Proposition 3 (The Eﬀect of Geographical Vulnerability to Cultural Diﬀu s i o no nt h eE q u i l i b r i u m
in the Agricultural Stage of Development) Under (A2), as long as the economy remains exclusively
agricultural, an increase in geographical vulnerability to cultural diﬀusion has an adverse eﬀect on
the steady-state levels of productivity in the rural sector and the size of the working population, but
has no eﬀect on the steady-state level of income per capita, i.e., for all µ ∈ (0,1),
dAR
ss/dµ < 0; dLss/dµ < 0;
dyss/dµ =0 .
Proof. Follows immediately from Proposition 1, while noting that ∂ω/∂µ>0 in (1). ¤
Hence, an economy that is characterized by greater geographical vulnerability to foreign
cultural inﬂuences, and, thus, by more cultural diﬀusion, is also associated with a relatively inferior
conditional Malthusian steady-state, in terms of the level of rural productivity per worker and
the size of its working population. This inferiority arises from the fact that greater geographical
vulnerability to cultural diﬀusion results in a relatively higher prevalence of cultural nonconformism
in society, with the adverse eﬀect of nonconformism on the transmission of society-speciﬁch u m a n
capital outweighing its productive role in the moderate advancement of rural productivity through
the expansion of the knowledge frontier. Nonetheless, the long-run level of income per capita is
unaﬀected by greater geographical vulnerability since the resulting lower level of productivity per
worker is accommodated by a smaller size of the working population.
The extent of geographical vulnerability to cultural diﬀusion, as a result of its inﬂuence on
the fraction of cultural nonconformists, however, also has an eﬀect on the timing of industrialization
and, thus, the take-oﬀ to a state of sustained economic growth. This eﬀect is summarized in the
following proposition.
37Proposition 4 (The Eﬀect of Geographical Vulnerability to Cultural Diﬀu s i o no nt h eT i m i n go f
Industrialization and the Take-oﬀ from Malthusian Stagnation) Consider an economy in a condi-
tional Malthusian steady-state equilibrium. Under (A2) and (A4), an increase in the geographical
vulnerability to cultural diﬀusion, as long as the vulnerability is not too high, has a beneﬁcial eﬀect
on the timing of the adoption of industry and, thus, on the timing of the take-oﬀ from Malthusian
stagnation, i.e.,
dgss/dµ R 0 if and only if µ Q µ∗,
where µ∗ is implicitly given by ω(µ∗,σ)=ω∗.
Proof. Follows immediately from Proposition 2, while noting that ∂ω/∂µ>0 in (1). ¤
Thus, productivity growth in the (latent) manufacturing sector at the conditional Malthu-
sian steady-state equilibrium is monotonically increasing in geographical vulnerability to cultural
diﬀusion up to a critical level µ∗, and monotonically decreasing thereafter.
The earlier take-oﬀ from the conditional Malthusian steady-state by a society that has
a higher but moderate geographical vulnerability to cultural diﬀusion, and, hence, possesses a
higher prevalence of moderated nonconformism, stems from the fact that the adverse eﬀect of
nonconformism on the intergenerational transmission of society-speciﬁc human capital is outweighed
by its beneﬁcial eﬀect on the advancement of knowledge, and, thus, on the advancement of industrial
productivity relative to that in agriculture. However, if the degree of vulnerability to diﬀusion is
too large, and, thus, the prevalence of nonconformism too high, an increase in vulnerability raises
the degree of anarchy in society and, thereby, severely disrupts the transmission of society-speciﬁc
human capital. Thus, while a higher degree of vulnerability to cultural diﬀusion increases the ﬂow
of new ideas, the rate at which these ideas are implemented and productivity is advanced in the
economy is diminished.
Following Propositions 3 and 4, variation across societies over a moderate range in the degree
of geographical vulnerability to cultural diﬀusion is associated with the phenomenon of overtaking in
global economic development. In particular, a higher degree of geographical vulnerability generates
an inferior economic outcome in the agricultural stage of development, but ultimately stimulates an
earlier industrialization and, thus, an earlier take-oﬀ to a state of sustained economic growth. By
inﬂuencing the cultural composition of societies throughout history, geography confers a profound
eﬀect on their experience with regard to the process of economic development.
Corollary 6 (Geographical Vulnerability to Cultural Diﬀusion and Overtaking). Consider two so-
cieties indexed by i ∈ {C,E}. Suppose that society E is characterized by a higher geographical
vulnerability to cultural diﬀusion, and, thus, a higher prevalence of cultural nonconformism, and
that µC <µ E <µ ∗,w h e r eµi is the degree of geographical vulnerability in society i.S o c i e t yE will
then be characterized by a inferior productivity in the Malthusian regime, but will overtake society
C via an earlier take-oﬀ into the industrial regime.
387C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This research argues that variations in the interplay between cultural assimilation and cultural
diﬀusion played a signiﬁcant role in giving rise to the diﬀerential patterns of economic development
across the globe. Societies that were geographically less vulnerable to cultural diﬀusion, beneﬁted
from enhanced assimilation, lower cultural diversity and, thus, more intense accumulation of society-
speciﬁc human capital, ﬂourishing in the technological paradigm that characterized the agricultural
stage of development. However, the lack of cultural diﬀusion and its manifestation in cultural
homogeneity and rigidity diminished the ability of these societies to adapt to a new technological
paradigm, delaying the onset of their industrialization and, thus, their take-oﬀ to a state of sustained
economic growth.
The superiority of societies that were geographically less vulnerable to cultural diﬀusion in
early stages of development stems from the dominance of the beneﬁcial eﬀect of an uninterrupted
process of cultural assimilation on the transmission of society-speciﬁc human capital over the ad-
verse eﬀect of cultural rigidity on the advancement of knowledge and its spillover to the agricultural
technology. In comparison, the earlier take-oﬀ of societies that were more vulnerable to cultural
diﬀusion, reﬂects the dominance of the beneﬁcial eﬀects of cultural diversity and ﬂexibility on the
advancement of the knowledge-intensive industrial technology, relative to its eroding eﬀect on the
accumulation of society-speciﬁc human capital.
Thus, in contrast to the cultural and institutional hypotheses, which posit a hierarchy
of cultural and institutional attributes in terms of their conduciveness to innovation and their
applicability towards an industrial take-oﬀ, the proposed theory suggests that the desirable degree
of the relative prevalence of cultural assimilation versus cultural diﬀusion varies according to the
stage of development. Enhanced cultural assimilation is optimal in the agricultural stage, but is
detrimental for the take-oﬀ to the industrial stage. Therefore, while cultural traits themselves
do not necessarily have a diﬀerential eﬀect on the process of development, it is the variation in
the relative strengths of the forces of cultural assimilation and cultural diﬀusion, which together
determine the overall degree of heterogeneity in these traits, that is instrumental for comparative
economic development.
The proposed theory elucidates how variation in the implementation of culture across so-
cieties can explain historical reversals in their economic performance during the course of the
worldwide transition from agriculture to industry and can, in fact, be applied more generally to
understand current and future reversals as the global frontier advances from one technological par-
adigm to another.34 Indeed, the trade-oﬀ between the beneﬁts of enhanced cultural assimilation in
the short-run and the costs of cultural rigidify in the long-run is analogous to the trade-oﬀ between
sexual and asexual reproduction with respect to biological ﬁtness. Asexual reproduction is beneﬁ-
cial in the short-run when the environment is relatively stable, while being costly in the long-run
34Brezis, Krugman, and Tsiddon (1993) attribute technological leapfrogging to the acquired comparative advantage
(via learning by doing) of the current technological leaders in the use of the existing technologies.
39due to its elimination of genetic diversity amongst oﬀspring, which may become critical for their
adaptability and, thus, survivability in a gradually changing environment.
Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a8 .Under AM
t < τ/(1 − γ), the Jacobian matrix of the conditional dynamical
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≡ Jss.( 2 9 )
It follows directly from (29) and (A2) that the trace of the matrix Jss is positive for any ω,i . e . ,
Tr(Jss)=1− ω(1 − β)+α > 0, ∀ω ∈ (0,1).( 3 0 )





is a locally asymptotically stable node of the conditional
dynamical system for any ω,i ts u ﬃces to show that, for all ω ∈ (0,1), the following restriction








,( 3 1 )
where the (open) upper bound on the determinant rules out the steady state as being either a spiral
sink or a spiral source, and the (open) lower bound rules out the steady state as being either a
saddle or an unstable node. In this regard, observe ﬁr s tt h a t( 2 9 )y i e l d s
Det(Jss)=α{1 − ω(1 − β)} − (1 − α)λω.( 3 2 )
40To verify the upper bound in (31) using (30) and (32), notice that
4Det(Jss) <Tr(Jss)
2 ⇔− 4(1− α)λω < [1 − ω(1 − β) − α]
2 ,
where the inequality always holds for any ω since (1 − α)λω > 0, ∀ω ∈ (0,1). To verify the lower
bound in (31) using (30) and (32), notice that
Det(Jss) >Tr(Jss) − 1 ⇔ (1 − α)ω(1 − β − λ) > 0,
where, again, the inequality always holds under (A2) for any ω ∈ (0,1), which completes the part





is a locally asymptotically stable node of the conditional dynamical
system comprised of (17) and (18).
To establish the necessary and suﬃcient condition for the local monotonic evolution of the
state variables, recall that such a condition must be necessary and suﬃcient to ensure that the
eigenvalues of Jss are both real and positive. The fact that the steady state is neither a spiral sink
nor a spiral source ensures that the eigenvalues of Jss are indeed real. Moreover, it follows from
(30) that, under (A2), at least one of the eigenvalues must be positive. Therefore, the condition
reduces to one that is necessary and suﬃcient to ensure that (32) is positive. Speciﬁcally,
Det(Jss) > 0 ⇔
α
α(1 − λ − β)+λ
> ω,
where the last inequality is precisely the condition speciﬁed in Lemma 8 for the monotonic evolution
of the state variables, thereby, completing the proof. ¤
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 0 .For the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h el e m m a ,i tf o l l o w sd i r e c t l yf r o m( 2 6 )t h a t







where ˆ ω ∈ (0,1) under assumption (A4).
For the sign of the derivative at 0 in the second part of the lemma, diﬀerentiating gss,a s
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where the positivity follows from assumptions (A2) and (A4). To derive the inﬂection point, twice












(1 − β)[(2− λ − 2β)(1− ω) − λ]
(1 − ω)(1− λ − β)
2 .( 3 5 )
It then follows immediately from (35) that
d2gss (ω)
(dω)
2 T 0 ⇔ ω T
2(1− λ − β)
2 − λ − 2β
≡ ˜ ω,










2 − λ − 2β
¶# λ
1−λ−β
− 1 < 0,( 3 6 )
where the negativity follows directly from (A2) and (A4), thereby, completing the proof. ¤
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